Control of Asynchronous Imitation Dynamics on Networks by Riehl, James et al.
Control of Asynchronous Imitation Dynamics
on Networks
James Riehl†, Pouria Ramazi† and Ming Cao†
Abstract—Imitation is widely observed in populations
of decision-making agents. Using our recent convergence
results for asynchronous imitation dynamics on networks,
we consider how such networks can be efficiently driven to
a desired equilibrium state by offering payoff incentives for
using a certain strategy, either uniformly or targeted to in-
dividuals. In particular, if for each available strategy, agents
playing that strategy receive maximum payoff when their
neighbors play that same strategy, we show that providing
incentives to agents in a network that is at equilibrium will
result in convergence to a unique new equilibrium. For the
case when a uniform incentive can be offered to all agents,
this result allows the computation of the optimal incentive
using a binary search algorithm. When incentives can be
targeted to individual agents, we propose an algorithm to
select which agents should be chosen based on iteratively
maximizing a ratio of the number of agents who adopt
the desired strategy to the payoff incentive required to
get those agents to do so. Simulations demonstrate that the
proposed algorithm computes near-optimal targeted payoff
incentives for a range of networks and payoff distributions
in coordination games.
I. INTRODUCTION
Networks in which agents make decisions by imitating
their most successful neighbors appear frequently in
sociology, biology, economics, and engineering [1], [2].
Such networks of success-based learners often exhibit
complex non-convergent behaviors even when the agents
are homogeneous. In particular, these networks are less
likely to converge than networks of agents who use
best responses; in other words, focusing on the success
of others hinders the agents from reaching satisfactory
decisions [3]. This non-convergence relates to volatility
and instability, which can have consequences ranging
from costly inefficiencies to catastrophic failures. Im-
itation is also known to lead to selfish behaviors in
various social contexts [2], which can manifest as social
dilemmas such as tragedy of the commons, in which
the pursuit of selfish goals leads to globally suboptimal
outcomes. However, in many of these cases it may be
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possible to circumvent the undesired global outcomes
by administering some small control input to the agents,
locally. Given that this could require a large amount of
total control effort, it is critical to develop methods for
achieving these goals as efficiently as possible. Game
theory is widely used to model distributed optimization
and learning in large populations of autonomous agents
[4]–[11], but more specifically, evolutionary game theory
allows for strategies to propagate through populations by
means other than rational choice, and therefore provides
an ideal framework to model networks of imitative
agents [12]–[17].
The use of payoff incentives to drive populations
towards a desired strategy is gaining in popularity [15],
[18]–[20]. Several approaches have been used to control
such networks, including offering incentives uniformly to
the agents in a network [21], [22], targeting individual
agents with incentives [22], and directly controlling the
strategies of some of the agents [19], [23]. There are
two key properties that facilitate the design of control
algorithms for each of these cases; if the network is at
some equilibrium, then providing incentives to the agents
should (i) cause no agent to switch away from a desired
strategy, and (ii) result in convergence of the network to
a unique equilibrium state. In [22], we have established
these properties for certain types of agents who update
asynchronously with best responses, but the conditions
under which networks of imitative agents can be driven
to a desired equilibrium remain to be discovered.
In this paper, we design efficient incentive-based con-
trol algorithms for three different control problems on
finite networks of heterogeneous decision-making indi-
viduals who asynchronously imitate their highest earning
neighbors. We start by building a general framework
for asynchronous network games with two available
strategies, A and B. Our main theoretical contribution
is to show that in any such network game, regardless
of the update rule, if all agents are A-coordinating, i.e.,
agents who update to strategy A would also do so if
they had more neighbors playing A, then providing in-
centives to the agents when the network is at equilibrium
(i) causes no agent to switch from A to B, and (ii)
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leads the network to a unique equilibrium regardless
of the agents’ activation sequence. Next we establish
that networks governed by imitation dynamics satisfy
these conditions provided that all agents are opponent
coordinating, i.e., agents’ payoffs are maximized when
their neighbors play the same strategy that they do. These
results make possible the design of efficient control
algorithms, using payoff incentives, to guarantee the
convergence of networks of imitative agents to a desired
strategy. First, for the case when an incentive is offered
uniformly to all agents, we provide a simple binary
search algorithm to compute the optimal incentive. Next,
when incentives can vary from agent to agent, inspired
by our approach for controlling best-response networks
[22], we propose the Iterative Potential-to-Reward Op-
timization (IPRO) algorithm, which selects agents to be
targeted based on iteratively maximizing a weighted ratio
of the number of agents who adopt the desired strategy
to the payoff incentive required to get those agents to do
so. Simulations show that the IPRO algorithm achieves
near optimal performance in a variety of cases and
outperforms several other incentive targeting algorithms
based on degree, earnings, and other criteria.
II. ASYNCHRONOUS NETWORK GAMES
Although this paper focuses primarily on imitative
agents, since some of the results apply to a broader class
of dynamics, we present here a generalized framework
for two-strategy asynchronous games on networks.
Consider an undirected network G = (V, E), in which
the nodes V = {1, . . . , n} represent agents and the
edges E ⊆ V × V define two-player games between
pairs of adjacent neighbors. Each agent starts by playing
one of the strategies A or B against all neighbors,
then accumulates the resulting payoffs, and the process
repeats at each time k ∈ {0, 1, . . .}. The possible payoffs
to an agent i ∈ V are defined by the payoff matrix
pii ∈ R2×2, whose entry pixi,xj represents agent i’s
payoff when playing strategy xi against a neighbor j
playing strategy xj , where xi, xj ∈ {A,B}, and we
define A = 1, B = 2 for the purposes of matrix indexing.
For compactness of notation, we stack all payoff matrices
in a 3-dimensional matrix pi ∈ (R2×2)n. The payoff of
agent i against all neighbors at time k is given by
ui(k) =
∑
j∈Ni
piixi(k),xj(k),
where Ni is the set of agent i’s neighbors. After collect-
ing all payoffs, one random agent i activates at time k
and updates to a new strategy at time k + 1 according
to an update rule, which we denote by R:
xi(k + 1) =

A if fi(x(k)) = {A}
B if fi(x(k)) = {B}
zi if fi(x(k)) = {A,B}
(1)
where the function fi : {A,B}n → {A,B, {A,B}}.
Each zi is fixed and equals either A,B or xi(k). By
a network game Γ : (G, pi,R) we mean a network G
of agents with payoff matrices pi, who update based on
the rule R. We do not prescribe any particular process
for driving the activation sequence, but we do make
the following assumption, which simply ensures that no
agent will stop updating after some amount of time.
Assumption 1. Every agent activates infinitely many
times as time goes to infinity.
Agents’ strategies evolve under the update rule ac-
cording to the sequence in which agents activate, and
may converge to an equilibrium state or continue to
fluctuate. An equilibrium of the network game is a state
x∗ at which no agents will switch strategies under their
respective update rules, implying that if x(k) = x∗
for some k ≥ 0, then x(k + 1) = x∗, regardless
of which agent is active at time k. Our eventual goal
is to use payoff incentives to control the dynamics of
network games such that the network reaches or gets
as close as possible to a desired equilibrium state in
which every agent plays strategy A. By offering payoff
incentives to a network, we mean offering non-negative
rewards for playing A to one or more agents in the
network, which equates to adding non-negative constants
to the first row of the corresponding payoff matrices.
To set the foundation for the main control results, we
first investigate when a network game governed by an
arbitrary update rule will reach a unique equilibrium
after offering payoff incentives.
III. UNIQUE EQUILIBRIUM CONVERGENCE OF
A-COORDINATING NETWORK GAMES
Equilibrium convergence is a key property of network
games, and can be guaranteed for certain classes of up-
date rules and agent payoff matrices [3], [13]. However,
it is not generally the case that such networks will con-
verge to a unique equilibrium, a property which is highly
desirable for the design of efficient and predictable
control algorithms. Here we establish conditions on the
agents and update rule under which unique equilibrium
convergence can be guaranteed.
We say a network game is A-coordinating if any
agent who updates to strategy A would also do so if
some agents currently playing B were instead playing
A. Formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 1. A network game (G, pi,R) is A-
coordinating if for any two strategy vectors y, z ∈
{A,B}n satisfying
yi = A⇒ zi = A ∀i ∈ V, (2)
the following holds
fi(y) = {A} ⇒ fi(z) = {A} ∀i ∈ V (3)
and
fi(y) = {A,B} ⇒ A ∈ fi(z) ∀i ∈ V. (4)
The A-coordinating property implies that an increase
in the number of agents playing A may lead agents
to switch from B to A but will never cause agents to
switch from A to B, yielding a monotone behavior in
agents’ strategy updates. We say that a network game
is A-monotone if, after offering payoff incentives to one
or more agents when the network is at any equilibrium,
no agent will ever switch from A to B. The following
proposition holds.
Proposition 1. Every A-coordinating network game is
A-monotone.
We need the following lemma for the proof.
Lemma 1. Consider an A-coordinating network game
(G, pi,R). If for some agent i ∈ V , one of the following
holds at some time k ≥ 0:
1) A ∈ fi(x(k)) and A 6∈ fi(x(k + 1)),
2) B 6∈ fi(x(k)) and B ∈ fi(x(k + 1)),
then an agent has switched from A to B at time k + 1.
Proof: We prove by contradiction. Assume the
negation of Lemma 1 holds for a network at some time
k and let x(k) denote the state of the network at that
time. Since no agent has switched from A to B at time
k + 1, the vectors y = x(k) and z = x(k + 1) satisfy
Condition (2). Now if Case 1 takes place, then either
fi(y) = {A}, violating (3) or fi(y) = {A,B}, violating
(4), a contradiction, yielding the result. If on the other
hand, Case 2 takes place, then fi(y) = {A}, violating
(3) since B ∈ fi(z), a contradiction, leading to the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1: We again prove by contra-
diction. Assume the contrary and let k1 ≥ 1 be the first
time that some agent i switches from A to B. Then one
of the following cases holds:
Case 1: A 6∈ fi(k1− 1). On the other hand, either the
strategy of agent i is A at 0, yielding A ∈ fi(0) since
the network is at equilibrium at 0, or there is some time
kˆ ∈ [0, k1 − 2] such that agent i switches to A at kˆ+ 1,
yielding A ∈ fi(kˆ). So in any case, there exists some
k0 ∈ [0, k1 − 1] such that A ∈ fi(k0). Therefore, since
A 6∈ fi(k1 − 1) there exists some time k2 ∈ [k0, k1 − 2]
such that A ∈ fi(k2) and A 6∈ fi(k2 + 1). In view of
Lemma 1, this implies that an agent has switched from
A to B at k2 + 1, a contradiction since k1 > k2 + 1 is
the first time that such a switch takes place, yielding the
result.
Case 2: fi(k1−1) = {A,B} and zi = B. On the other
hand, either the strategy of agent i is A at 0, yielding
fi(0) = {A} since zi = B and that the network is at
equilibrium at 0, or there is some time kˆ ∈ [0, k1 − 2]
such that agent i switches to A at kˆ+1, yielding fi(kˆ) =
{A}. So in any case, there exists some k0 ∈ [0, k1 − 1]
such that fi(k0) = {A}. Therefore, since fi(k1 − 1) =
{A,B} there exists some time k2 ∈ [k0, k1 − 2] such
that B 6∈ fi(k2) and B ∈ fi(k2 + 1). In view of Lemma
1, this implies that an agent has switched from A to B
at k2 + 1, a contradiction, leading to the proof.
Moreover, we say that a network switches sequence-
independently if, after offering incentives to one or more
agents when the network is at equilibrium, any agent
who switches from B to A under one activation sequence
will do so under any activation sequence (possibly at a
different time).
Proposition 2. Every A-coordinating network switches
sequence-independently.
This proposition can be explained intuitively as
follows. Consider two activation sequences S1 :=
{i0, i1, . . .} and S2 := {j0, j1, . . .}. Let i be the first
agent who switches from B to A under the sequence
S1. Since switches from A to B are impossible due to
Proposition 1, this must be the first switch of any kind.
The first time agent i is active under the sequence S2,
she will also switch from B to A since up to that time,
agents may have switched only from B to A under S2,
again due to the monotonicity established in Proposition
1. Then by induction, the same can be shown for the
second and later agents who switch their strategies from
B to A under S1. We formalize and prove this statement
in the following Lemma, borrowing some ideas from our
previous result in [22]. Let t0 be the first time when agent
j0 is active in S1. Then for s = 1, 2, . . ., define ks as the
first time after ks−1 that agent js is active in S1. The
time ks exists because of the assumption that each agent
activates infinitely many times. Denote by x1i and x
2
i ,
the strategies of agent i under the activation sequences
S1 and x2i (k), respectively.
Lemma 2. Consider an A-coordinating network game
(G, pi,R) which is at equilibrium at time 0. Suppose that
some payoff incentives are offered at time 0. Then given
any two activation sequences S1 = {i0, i1, . . .} and
S2 = {j0, j1, . . .}, the following holds for s = 0, 1, 2 . . .
x2js(s+ 1) = A ⇒ x1js(ks + 1) = A. (5)
Proof: We prove by induction on s. The statement
is first shown for s = 0. Suppose x2j0(1) = A. The initial
strategy of agent j0 is the same under both sequences,
i.e., x1j0(0) = x
2
j0(0). Therefore, since the network game
is A-monotone in view of Proposition 1, no agent has
switched to B before time k0, under S2. So since the
network game is A-coordinating, it follows that x1j0(k0+
1) = A if x1j0(1) = A, verifying (5) for s = 0.
Now assume that (5) holds for s = 0, 1, . . . , r − 1.
Suppose x2jr (r + 1) = A. Now since (5) holds for all
s = 0, 1, . . . , r − 1, and because of Proposition 1, we
obtain that if any agents have switched and hence fixed
their strategies from B to A under S2 up to the time
k = r, they have also done so under S1 up to any time
k ≥ kr−1 + 1. Moreover, no agent has switched from B
to A under S1. Thus, the strategy vectors y = x2(r) and
z = x1(kr) satisfy the condition in (3). Hence, (5) is true
for s = r since the network game is A-coordinating.
Proof of Proposition 2: The proof follows directly
from Lemma 2.
These two properties of A-coordinating network
games lead to the main result of this section. We say
that a network game is uniquely convergent, if after
offering some payoff incentives when the network is at
equilibrium, the network will again reach an equilibrium
state which is unique and does not depend on the
sequence in which agents activate.
Theorem 1. Every A-coordinating network game is
uniquely convergent.
Proof: According to Proposition 1, no agent
switches from B to A. Since by Assumption 1, every
agent activates infinitely many times, it follows that the
network will reach an equilibrium state at some finite
time after a maximum of n total strategy switches. It
remains to prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium for
all activation sequences, which we do by contradic-
tion. Assume that there exist two activation sequences
S1 = {i0, i1, . . .} and S2 = {j0, j1, . . .} that drive
the network to two distinct equilibrium states. This
implies the existence of an agent q whose strategy differs
between the two equilibria, say B under the equilibrium
of S1 and A under the equilibrium of S2, without loss of
generality. However, in view of Proposition 2, agent q
will switch from B to A at some time under S1 and
will not change afterwards because of Proposition 1,
implying that the network was not at equilibrium, which
is a contradiction and completes the proof.
IV. IMITATION UPDATE RULE
The imitation update rule I dictates that agent i, active
at time k, updates at time k+1 to the strategy of the agent
earning the highest payoff at time k in the neighborhood
Ni ∪ {i}. If neighbors using both strategies earn the
highest payoff, we assume agent i does not switch:
xi(k + 1) =

A SMi (k) = {A}
B SMi (k) = {B}
xi(k) SMi (k) = {A,B}
(6)
where SMi (k) is the set of strategies earning the maxi-
mum payoff in the neighborhood of agent i, that is
SMi (k) ∆=
{
xj(k)
∣∣∣uj(k) = max
r∈Ni∪{i}
ur(k)
}
.
Asynchronous imitation updates may not in general
result in convergence to an equilibrium, but we have
established in [3] that such networks will converge when
all agents are opponent coordinating, i.e., earn maximum
payoff when their neighbors play the same strategy that
they do. Equivalently, each diagonal entry of the payoff
matrix of an opponent-coordinating agent i is greater
than the off-diagonal in the same row:
pii1,1 > pi
i
1,2, pi
i
2,2 > pi
i
2,1. (7)
The following proposition implies that such networks are
also A-coordinating.
Proposition 3. Every network of opponent-coordinating
agents who update according to the imitation rule I is
A-coordinating.
Proof: Consider two strategy vectors y, z ∈
{A,B}n satisfying (2), and let the network be at state
y. First we look at the case when fi(y) = {A} for some
agent i ∈ V , implying that the highest-earning agent in
the neighborhood Ni ∪ {i} of agent i is an A-playing
agent. Now, if the strategy of some of the B-playing
agents are changed to A so that the network reaches z,
then the payoff of no A-playing agent decreases and the
payoff of no B-playing agent increases since all agents
are opponent coordinating. Hence, the highest-earning
agent in the neighborhood of agent i will still be an A-
playing agent, yielding fi(z) = {A}, resulting in (3).
The case when fi(y) = {A,B} can be proven similarly.
The next corollary follows directly from Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. Every network of opponent-coordinating
agents is A-monotone and uniquely convergent.
That is, when a network of opponent-coordinating
agents is at equilibrium at time 0, if non-negative rewards
are offered to one or more agents whenever they play A
at some time k ≥ 0, then no agent will switch from A to
B at any time k ≥ 1, and the whole network will reach
a unique equilibrium at some finite time.
V. CONTROL THROUGH PAYOFF INCENTIVES
Having established the unique equilibrium conver-
gence in networks of opponent-coordinating agents, we
now investigate the efficient use of payoff incentives
to drive such networks of imitative agents from any
undesired equilibrium toward a desired equilibrium in
which all or at least more agents play strategy A.
A. Uniform Reward Control
Suppose that some central agency has the ability to
offer a reward of r0 ≥ 0 to all agents whenever they
play strategy A. The resulting payoff matrix is given by
pˆii :=
( A B
A ai + r0 bi + r0
B ci di
)
, ai, bi, ci, di ∈ R,
for each agent i ∈ V . Let B denote the n-dimensional
strategy vector in which each agent plays B. The control
objective in this case is the following.
Problem 1 (Uniform reward control). Given a network
game Γ = (G, pi,I) and initial strategies x(0) 6= B, find
the infimum reward r∗0 such that for every r0 > r
∗
0 , every
agent will eventually play A.
In networks of opponent-coordinating agents, it is rel-
atively straightforward to compute the optimal value of
r∗0 once we have established the properties in Section III.
We take advantage of two key properties established in
Corollary 1. First, the number of agents who converge to
A is monotone in the value of r0 due to the A-monotone
property. Second, simulations of the network game are
fast to compute due to the unique convergence property.
That is, to test the effect of a particular payoff incentive,
since all activation sequences will result in the same
equilibrium, we can choose a sequence consisting only
of agents who will switch from B to A, which will have
a maximum length of n before reaching equilibrium.
We begin by generating a setR containing all possible
candidate infimum rewards. This set is generated by
computing all possible payoff differences between agents
playing B and agents playing A when they are neighbors
or linked by another initially B-playing agent. Consider
a network of opponent-coordinating agents that is at
equilibrium at time zero. Let nAi denote the number of
neighbors of agent i who initially play A. Since no agent
will switch from A to B, the possible payoffs of an agent
i when playing A (resp. B) at any time step are contained
in the sets
ΠAi
∆
=
{
ai(n
A
i + δi) + bi(degi−nAi − δi) : δi ∈ ∆i
}
ΠBi
∆
=
{
ci(n
A
i + δi) + di(degi−nAi − δi) : δi ∈ ∆i
}
,
where ∆i = {0, 1, . . . ,degi−nAi }.
Now consider an agent s who initially plays B and
has a neighbor j whose strategy was either initially A
or became A at some other time. In order for agent j to
cause agent s to switch to A, the payoff of agent j must
be greater than that of each B-playing agent (denoted by
i) in the neighborhood of agent s. Therefore, the reward
given to agent j must be greater than
yBi −yAj
degj
for some
yBi ∈ ΠBi and yAj ∈ ΠAj . This leads to the following
set of all candidate infimum rewards, formally derived
in the proof of Proposition 4.
R ∆=
{yBi − yAj
degj
∣∣∣yBi ∈ ΠBi , yAj ∈ ΠAj ,
j ∈ Ns, i ∈ Ns ∪ {s}, xi(0) = B,
s ∈ V, xs(0) = B
}
∪ {0}.
Proposition 4. For a network of opponent-coordinating
agents with initial strategies x(0) 6= B, r∗0 ∈ R.
Proof: Should all agents’ strategies be initially A,
the result is trivial since r∗0 = 0. So consider the situation
where at least one B-playing agent exists. We observe
that the network will reach the state of all A after
offering the reward r at time k = 0, if the following
condition is satisfied: for every agent s ∈ V who initially
plays B, there exists some time ks such that xs(ks) = B
and xs(ks + 1) = A. Equivalently, for every initially B-
playing agent s ∈ V , there must exist some time ks and
A-playing neighbor j ∈ Ns, xj(ks) = A, such that for
all B-playing agents i ∈ Ns ∪ {s}, xi(ks) = B,
r degj +uj(k
s) > ui(k
s).
Since uj(ks) ∈ ΠAj , ui(ks) ∈ ΠBi and xi(0) = B, the
condition is satisfied if the following holds: for every
initially B-playing agent s ∈ V , there exists some time
ks and agent j ∈ Ns, such that for all i ∈ Ns ∪ {s},
xi(0) = B,
r degj +y
A
j > y
B
i
for some yAj ∈ ΠAj and some yBi ∈ ΠBi . Now since this
is a sufficient condition for r to drive the network to the
all-A state, we have that
r∗0 = inf
{
r
∣∣∣r > yBi − yAj
degj
, yBi ∈ ΠBi , yAj ∈ ΠAj ,
j ∈ Ns, i ∈ Ns ∪ {s}, xi(0) = B,
s ∈ V, xs(0) = B
}
,
implying that
r∗0 ∈
{
r
∣∣∣r = yBi − yAj
degj
, yBi ∈ ΠBi , yAj ∈ ΠAj ,
j ∈ Ns, i ∈ Ns ∪ {s}, xi(0) = B,
s ∈ V, xs(0) = B
}
= R− {0}.
By summarizing this case and the case when r∗0 = 0, we
complete the proof.
Next we sort the elements of R from low to high and
denote this vector by vR. Algorithm 1 performs a binary
search over vR to find the infimum reward such that all
agents in the network will eventually play A. Denote
by 1 the n-dimensional vector containing all ones. In
what follows, we also denote by x¯ the unique equilibrium
resulting from a particular set of incentives being offered
to a network of A-coordinating agents starting from x.
i− := 1
i+ := |R|
while i+ − i− > 1 do
r∗0 := v
R
j , where j := d i
−+i+
2 e
Γˆ := (G, pˆi, I)
Simulate Γˆ from x(0) until equilibrium x¯
if x¯i = A for all i ∈ V then
i+ := j
else
i− := j
end
end
Algorithm 1: Binary search over candidate rewards to
find the value of r∗0 that solves Problem 1 for networks
of opponent-coordinating agents.
Proposition 5. Algorithm 1 computes the reward r∗0 that
solves Problem 1 for networks of opponent-coordinating
agents.
Proof: Since r∗0 ∈ R due to Proposition 4, we
can restrict our search to the set R. Due to Theorem
1, we know that if a given incentive r0 results in all
agents switching to A for one activation sequence, then it
does so for every activation sequence. Therefore, we can
determine the exact equilibrium resulting from offering
an incentive r0 by using any activation sequence. Now
consider two incentives q > p ≥ 0. Corollary 1 implies
that no agent can switch from B to A after offering
an incentive to a network at equilibrium. Hence, if an
agent i who initially plays B does not switch to A
under incentive q, then that agent will also not switch to
A under incentive p. Otherwise, offering the additional
incentive q− p to a network at the equilibrium resulting
from incentive p would cause this agent to switch from B
to A, a contradiction. It follows from this monotonicity
property that a binary search on the ordered list vR will
yield the solution to Problem 1.
B. Targeted Reward Control
Suppose that rather than offering a uniform incentive
to all agents who play strategy A, one has the ability
to offer a different reward to each agent. By targeting
the most influential agents in the network, it may be
possible to achieve the desired outcome at much lower
cost than with uniform rewards, but which agents should
be targeted and how much reward should be offered to
each of these agents?
Let r := (r1, . . . , rn)T denote the vector of rewards
offered to each agent, where ri ∈ R≥0 is the reward
offered to agent i, resulting in the following payoff
matrix for each agent i ∈ V:
pˆii :=
( A B
A ai + ri bi + ri
B ci di
)
, ai, bi, ci, di ∈ R.
The targeted control objective is the following.
Problem 2 (Targeted reward control). Given a network
game Γ = (G, pi,I) and initial strategies x(0) 6= B, find
the targeted reward vector r∗ that minimizes
∑
i∈V r
∗
i
such that if ri > r∗i for each i, then every agent will
eventually play A.
Towards a solution to this problem, we observe that
for a network at some equilibrium state x¯, the only way
to get imitating agents to switch from B to A through
positive rewards is to offer those rewards to agents who
start at A or will switch to A at some time and who
have at least one neighbor playing B. For such an agent,
the infimum reward such that at least one B-playing
neighbor will switch to A is
rˇi = max
j∈NBi
max
k∈NBj
u¯k − u¯i, (8)
where u¯i denotes the payoff of agent i when the state
of the network is x¯, and NBi := {j ∈ Ni ∪ {i} : x¯j =
B} denotes the self-inclusive set of neighbors of agent
i who are playing B. Due to Corollary 1, offering this
incentive to agent i will result in a unique equilibrium
regardless of the activation sequence. As a result, we
can repeatedly use (10) to construct a targeted reward
vector starting from the previous equilibrium. Indeed, an
algorithm which iteratively offers rewards in this manner
can be used to compute a reward vector that achieves
uniform convergence to A. A generic version of such an
algorithm is described below, in which the key step is
the choice of the agent j at each iteration, and  denotes
an arbitrarily small positive constant.
Initialize x¯i = xi(0) and ri = 0 for each i ∈ V
while ∃i ∈ V : x¯i 6= A do
AB := {i ∈ V : x¯i = A ∧ [∃j ∈ Ni : x¯j = B]}
Choose an agent j ∈ AB
Let rj := rj + rˇj + 
Γˆ := (G, pˆi, I)
Simulate Γˆ from x¯ until equilibrium x¯′
x¯ := x¯′
end
Algorithm 2: Generic iterative algorithm for comput-
ing a reward vector such that all agents in the network
will play strategy A.
It is possible to find the exact solution r∗ to Problem
2 using Algorithm 2 to perform an exhaustive search
on every possible sequence of agents in the initial set
AB . However, the computational complexity of such
an algorithm prohibits its use on large networks. In
Section VI, we explore the use of various heuristics for
choosing an agent to target at each iteration, including
random selection, maximum degree, and maximum pay-
off earnings. Next, we propose a slightly more advanced
heuristic for incentive targeting inspired by a similar
approach to controlling best-response networks [22].
Consider a network of opponent-coordinating agents,
which is at some equilibrium state x¯. In order to identify
which agents should be offered incentives, we propose
a simple potential function
Φ(x) =
n∑
i=1
nAi (x), (9)
where nAi (x) denotes the number of neighbors of agent
i who play strategy A in the state x. This function has
a unique maximum, which occurs when all agents play
A, and increases whenever an agent switches from B
to A. Problem 2 is thus equivalent to the problem of
finding the infimum reward vector that maximizes Φ(x).
Therefore we propose a type of greedy algorithm which
iteratively chooses the agent who maximizes the ratio of
the change in potential to the reward required to achieve
that change. Let x¯′ denote the equilibrium resulting from
offering the reward rˇj to agent j. We define the iterative
potential to reward algorithm (IPRO) as Algorithm 2 in
which the targeted agent is selected as follows.
j∗ = arg max
j∈AB
∆Φ(x¯)α
rˇβj
, (10)
where ∆Φ(x¯) := Φ(x¯′) − Φ(x¯), and α, β ≥ 0 are free
design parameters.
C. Budgeted Targeted Reward Control
In this section, we suppose that there is a limited bud-
get from which to offer rewards and pose the following
variation to Problem 2.
Problem 3 (Budgeted targeted reward control). Given a
network game Γ = (G, pi,I), initial strategy state x(0),
and budget constraint
∑
i∈V ri < ρ, find the reward
vector r∗ that maximizes the number of agents in the
network who will eventually play A.
Algorithm 3 slightly modifies Algorithm 2 to approx-
imate the solution to Problem 3. The only difference is
that the algorithm will now terminate if no more agents
can be offered a reward without violating the budget
constraint ρ.
Initialize x¯i = xi(0) and ri = 0 for each i ∈ V
while ∃i ∈ V : x¯i 6= A and
∑
i∈V
ri < ρ do
AB := {i ∈ V : x¯i = A ∧ [∃j ∈ Ni : x¯j =
B]} ∧ rˇi ≤ ρ−
∑
i∈V ri}
Choose an agent j ∈ AB
Let rj := rj + rˇj + 
Γˆ := (G, pˆi, I)
Simulate Γˆ from x¯ until equilibrium x¯′
x¯ := x¯′
end
Algorithm 3: Generic iterative algorithm for com-
puting a reward vector to approximate the maximum
number of agents who will play strategy A.
VI. SIMULATIONS
Here we compare the performance of the IPRO al-
gorithm to some alternative approaches for controlling
networks of agents with imitative dynamics. Each of
these methods is applied iteratively, targeting agents
with payoff rewards until either the control objective is
achieved or the budget limit is reached. Short descrip-
tions of each algorithm under consideration are provided
below.
• Iterative Random (rand): target random agents in
the network
• Iterative Degree-Based (deg): target agents with
maximum degree
• Iterative Maximum Earning (IME): target A-
playing agents earning the highest payoffs while
having at least one neighbor playing B
• Iterative Potential Optimization (IPO): target
agents resulting in the maximum increase of the
potential function (α = 1, β = 0)
• Iterative Reward Optimization (IRO): target
agents requiring minimum reward (α = 0, β = 1)
• Iterative Potential-to-Reward Optimization
(IPRO): target agents maximizing the potential-
change-to-reward ratio (α = 1, β = 1)
• Optimal: perform exhaustive search to find optimal
solution (only practical for small networks)
For each set of simulations, we generate geometric
random networks by randomly distributing n agents in
the unit square and connecting all pairs of agents who
lie within a distance R of each other.
Heterogeneous payoffs for the agents are generated
as follows: pii = piI + viWi, where pi ≥ 1 denotes
the coordination level, vi ∈ [0, 1] denotes the payoff
variance, and Wi is a 2 × 2 matrix whose elements
are drawn independently at random from a uniform
distribution on the interval [0, 1]. Also, the Wi matrices
are independent across all agents. Next, we present four
brief simulation studies and provide graphical results,
which are also summarized in Table I.
A. Uniform vs. Targeted Reward Control
First, we investigate the difference between uniform
and targeted reward control to estimate the expected
cost savings when individual agents can be targeted for
rewards rather than offering a uniform reward to all
agents. Fig. 1 shows that targeted reward control offers
a large cost savings over uniform rewards, but also that
the savings decreases as the networks get larger. Notably,
this differs from our findings on best-response networks,
in which the opposite effect was observed [22].
B. Targeted-Reward Control: Network Size
Next, we compare algorithm performance for various
sizes of networks of opponent-coordinating agents, using
the same network setup as the previous section. Fig.
2 shows that in this case the IPRO and degree-based
algorithms perform the best across all network sizes.
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Fig. 1. Comparison of uniform and targeted reward control on
geometric random networks for a range of sizes. For each size
tested, 100 random networks were generated using a connection radius
R =
√
(1 + degexp)/pin, corresponding to a mean node degree of
approximately degexp = 4. The parameter values used to generate the
payoffs were pi = 1 and vi = 12 .
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Fig. 2. Comparison of algorithms for different sizes of networks. The
connection radius, threshold distribution, and payoffs are generated
exactly as in the simulations for Fig. 1.
C. Targeted-Reward Control: Network Connectivity
We now investigate the effect of network connectivity
on the total reward required to achieve consensus in
strategy A. We consider geometric random networks of
20 agents, which is small enough that we can compute
the optimal solution using an exhaustive search algorithm
and compare this with the proposed algorithms. Fig.
3 shows that there is a sharp decrease in the mean
incentive required as the networks become more densely
connected, likely due to the fact that high-earning agents
become more influential. All of the algorithms except for
random and IPO yielded near-optimal results in these
tests, with IPRO performing the best.
D. Targeted-Reward Control: Payoff Variance
Finally, we vary the parameter vi to understand how
the algorithms perform for varying degrees of agent
heterogeneity. Fig. 4 shows that the IPRO algorithm
performs the best of the algorithms regardless of the
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Fig. 3. Comparison of algorithms on 500 sparsely to densely connected
20-node geometric random networks.
degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity of the agents.
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Fig. 4. Comparison of algorithms for different amounts of payoff
variance vi. 500 20-node networks are tested for each value of vi.
TABLE I
SIMULATION RESULTS: MEAN INCENTIVES
Algorithm Fig. 2 Fig. 3 Fig. 4
rand .090 .086 .143
deg .046 .066 .120
IRO .051 .065 .119
IPO .060 .075 .131
IME .052 .067 .121
IPRO .046 .064 .117
opt – .063 .116
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have revealed three properties of asynchronous
A-coordinating network games under any update rule
after incentives are offered to agents when the network
is at equilibrium: (i) no agent will switch from A to
B; (ii) switches occur independent of the sequence in
which agents activate; (iii) the network will converge
to a unique equilibrium. This predictability after of-
fering rewards facilitates the design of efficient and in
some cases optimal control protocols. We have further
shown that a subset of networks in which agents asyn-
chronously imitate their highest earning neighbor, i.e.,
networks of opponent-coordinating agents, are indeed
A-coordinating, and therefore satisfy the above three
properties. Based on this result, we proposed protocols
for three control problems that apply to this class of
networks: uniform reward control, targeted reward con-
trol, and budgeted targeted reward control. In particular,
the IPRO algorithm, which iteratively chooses agents
who maximize the ratio of change in potential to offered
reward, performs near-optimal in several different cases
and outperforms those based on other heuristics such as
maximum payoff-earning or minimum required reward.
In the future, it would be useful to extend this research to
networks containing non-coordinating agents. Although
a similar approach may remain effective for this more
general case, it might require relaxing the problem
statements since it is unlikely that monotonicity and
unique convergence will still hold.
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